Macroeconomics

Rationalizing Irrationality

The old are wise. The kind are weak. The fat are lazy. Though seemingly uncorrelated on the surface, these three statements are bound by a single commonality: they are all assumptions. Assumptions are commonplace in…

The old are wise. The kind are weak. The fat are lazy.

Though seemingly uncorrelated on the surface, these three statements are bound by a single commonality: they are all assumptions. Assumptions are commonplace in everyday life; they always have been. It’s within human nature to make them—a nature that has influenced the way we move forward with academia and our pursuit of knowledge. Economics, as both a practice and a science, employs a bevy of assumptions; many of its foundations, principles, and models rest upon them. Information symmetry, perfect competition, and ceteris paribus—the very building blocks of economics—are built upon these ideas. One of the most crucial and universally imposed assumptions in economics, however, concerns not firms or systems, nor policies and institutions, but you and me: the consumers. Consumer rationality theory posits that consumers engage in rational decision-making, aiming to maximize personal utility with constraints on personal wealth and information. In theory, this implies consumers prioritize value-for-money purchases and spending behaviors. In practice, it begins to fall short.

Under the framework of the rational consumer, high-priced premiums should exist exclusively under the prerequisite of proportionally greater utility. Theory and reality, however, are often different, if not in contrast, with one another. Such a departure from theory can be found globally, but is most evident in the United States, where consumer psychology is being actively reconfigured in response to shifting cultural values. Modern media and emerging cultural zeitgeists have produced a culture increasingly driven by materialism, fueled by the glorification of purchases that convey status and wealth rather than traditional utility. Whereas in the past we may have sought practicality, now we seek something else entirely—something abstract and not functional. Consumers no longer seek to maximize the utility value of the dollar, but rather the status it offers. Put simply, people aren’t buying the art, but the applause that comes with it. 

Empirical patterns of consumption in the US validate this assertion with surprising clarity. Seldom is a Casio valorized above a Rolex, nor does Jansport inspire the queues routinely seen outside Goyard. Same purpose, same functionality, same ability—separated only by tens of thousands of dollars. To further paint the picture, the US consistently represents one of the largest segments of the global personal luxury goods market. In 2024, the global market amassed over 364 billion USD in spending, up over 200 billion dollars from only two decades ago. The immediate question is clear: What invisible incentive drives supposedly rational consumers to spend disproportionately more money for only minor functional improvements? And, more importantly, is such behaviour still “rational”? As it turns out, reevaluating consumer spending behaviour depicts not a contradiction with rationality, but rather an evolution of it wherein consumers seek to maximize social and psychological utility over functional or intrinsic value, necessitating a reconsideration of the limits of classical rationality models. 

A Misunderstanding of Value 

It’s not that materialistic consumption is impossible to rationalize, but rather that conceptions of “value” have morphed as rising materialism endogenized its classical definition. The Intrinsic Value Theory posits that the value of a good or service is contained within the item itself and is an objective, inherent aspect of the good or service. If utility is derived from the value gained by a good, then it logically stands to reason that a driving motive behind purchases must be the intrinsic value gained from it. In defiance of this theory, however, consumers are no longer seeking solely maximal functional utility, but also aiming to optimize social and psychological returns. This shifts the derivation of value towards goods and services whose utility is more positional, symbolic, and socially mediated than functional. Classical economic models fail to fully incorporate this change, and theory must therefore be reconciled with reality to sharpen the accuracy and practicality of economic analysis. 

Consumer rationality implies that a willingness to pay significantly more for a product should typically be accompanied by proportionally higher satisfaction and utility from said goods. However, in practical consumer economies, consumers’ willingness to make purchases is increasingly derived from external and symbolic factors such as identity expression, social conformity, and external perception. Given the human tendency to seek social validation and belonging, it stands to reason that the additional expenses people are willing to incur are not simply a function of performance, but perception—a desire to be known, to be accepted, to be recognized. It may appear irrational in a definitional sense, but from a broader perspective, perhaps consumers are simply maximizing a different type of utility: the utility of social returns. Thus, the critical issue is not that utility maximization fails or is void, but rather that its classical definition is incomplete. 

Graphic By: Amber Yu


Mechanisms of Materialistic Consumption

Perhaps the most significant driver of materialistic consumption is status competition, which is in turn centered on the concept of positional goods, whose value hinges on their placement relative to alternatives. These markets are unique in that product differentiation is engendered not primarily by research and development, nor necessarily by advertising and innovation, but rather by manufactured exclusivity. By imposing drastic price premiums, brands make their goods feel more exclusive, more elite, and therefore (given the inherent nature of human behaviour) more desirable—resulting in “conspicuous consumption.” 

Despite a widespread understanding that these brands may not differ all too much from their cheaper counterparts, this phenomenon helps explain the persistence of luxury competition as a form of status signaling. A Rolex isn’t bought to tell the time, and a Bentley isn’t bought to drive to your local grocery store. Both serve a purpose beyond function or practice. In contrast to conventional wisdom, households, specifically those in lower-income brackets, allocate a disproportionately high share of their budgets to visible goods intended to signal social and financial status, even at the expense of savings or investment gains. Thus, the assumption that consumers independently optimize spending must be called into question, instead suggesting a form of utility that is relational rather than independent. The trade-off between potential wealth gains from savings and investments in favour of material consumption consequently produces a zero-sum dynamic in which heightened spending does not necessarily translate to greater aggregate welfare, at least not in tangible terms. 

Importantly, the concepts explored thus far—value, utility, and rationality—all revolve around one central factor: perception. Consequently, cognitive biases that weaken value-for-money optimization become a crucial determinant of consumer rationality. One such example is the price-quality heuristic wherein consumers infer a higher quality from higher prices, regardless of objectively negligible differences between goods. The result is a systematic overestimation of the valuation of goods with price premiums. Unlike standard models, which depict an inverse relationship between price and demand, the price of these Veblen goods creates demand rather than curtailing it. Furthermore, cognitive biases and emotional decision-making often produce a heightened inclination toward immediate gratification over long-term valuation. As a general application, studies have shown that consumers repeatedly overvalue short-term rewards relative to long-term ones. Such a predilection can lead to impulsive spending and suboptimal financial decisions, pushing consumers to accept and justify price premiums. 

These factors coalesce to engender a systematic divergence from classical rationality. This perceived irrationality is not simply the occasional mistake or misjudgment but rather bred from an environment that consistently distorts perceived value within consumer cognition. 

Welfare and Economic Implications

Ultimately, regardless of how much is spent and on what, consumer benefit remains the cardinal force behind consumption. Consumers make purchases based on the belief that whatever is gained post-transaction will justify the incurred costs. Whether one buys a Bugatti or a Toyota, the purchase is made for the sake of some perceived benefit, even if said benefit is derived from different facets of rationality. The question, then, is whether or not material spending objectively benefits the consumer in the broader picture. Evidence points to the contrary, linking materialism to lower overall life satisfaction outside of the immediate gratification of the initial transaction. Highly materialistic consumers typically report lower levels of happiness, higher anxiety, and (ironically) weaker social relationships. Despite psychological studies attributing the intention of materialism to social inclusion and heightened validation, its practical effects prove counterproductive. In the long run, consumption as a means of attaining status has diminishing, and often negative, returns.

From a welfare perspective, materialism carries significant implications at both an individual and societal level, given that materialistic consumption breeds both positional competition and reduced well-being. Furthermore, one could argue that this form of spending may also augment inefficiencies by reallocating resources toward signaling goods rather than functional ones. Incorporating this line of economic thought calls for a reconsideration of welfare analysis. If consumption—particularly the materialistic kind—does not reliably increase well-being in the broader individual or societal sense, then conventional gauges of economic development, such as GDP, may overstate our progress in such matters. Spending that does not reasonably contribute to well-being would be left undifferentiated from spending that does. Perhaps an alternative measure of subjective well-being may paint a more accurate picture than the one presently drawn. 

Still, incorporating this new value system into classical economics remains challenging. Whereas value for money can be somewhat objectively gauged, this expanded understanding of value, which includes status signalling and social perversions, forces us to recognize that preferences and therefore utilities are endogenous. They are determined not by objective metrics or concrete number valuations, but by culture, institutions, market forces, and, of course, by the consumers themselves. Preferences are not fixed, and neither are the assumptions built upon them. 

Conclusions

Though consumer rationality theory remains, and perhaps will always be, an integral cornerstone of economic theory, the assumptions it relies on and the definitions it adheres to are increasingly diverging from reality in the modern economy. Consumption patterns today reflect a spending psychology more centered around meaning, identity, and status. No longer is consumption about what the good is, but what the good means. Though this new way of valuing goods is relatively unconventional, it should not be understood as inherently wrong. Rather, it reflects a broader, more complex definition of utility. This distinction is important, yet widely unaccounted for. Reconciling this growing divide stands as an economic imperative that should be confronted sooner rather than later to realize a better understanding and subsequent application of economics, both today and moving forward. The bottom line is that in a world where perception has come to outweigh performance, and a society where our priorities have shifted towards the abstract, rationality has neither disappeared nor faltered—it has evolved.

Disclaimer: The views published in this journal are those of the individual authors or speakers and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of Berkeley Economic Review staff, the Undergraduate Economics Association, the UC Berkeley Economics Department and faculty, or the University of California at Berkeley in general.

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